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ABSTRACT 
In September 2013 in the case of Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness) the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue of whether section 6(1) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Charter, which grants Canadians the right 
to enter Canada was violated in a case where the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness declined to consent to the transfer of a Canadian citizen to serve his sentence 
in Canada where the sentencing state had consented to the transfer. Another issue was 
whether sections 8(1) and 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a) of the International Transfer of Offenders 
Act, which granted the Minister the discretion to consent or not to consent to the transfer, 
were contrary to section 6(1) of the Charter. In resolving the above issues, the Court 
referred to its earlier jurisprudence, academic publications and international law. Although 
the Court agreed with the government that the appeal was moot because the appellant had 
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left the USA by the time it was heard, it held that it retained “a residual discretion to decide 
the merits of a moot appeal if the issues raised are of public importance” and that this case 
was one of public importance because “[t]he issues are likely to recur in the future and there 
is some uncertainty resulting from conflicting decisions in the Federal Court.” The purpose of 
this article is to highlight the interpretative tools invoked by the court and the implications of 
the judgement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are hundreds of Canadians serving prison sentences in other countries, 
most of them in the United States of America. There are also many foreign 
nationals serving prison sentences in Canada.1 In order to ensure that Canadians 
who are imprisoned abroad are transferred to serve their sentences in Canada, 
Canada has taken three approaches: it has ratified multilateral treaties on the 
transfer of offenders; it has signed bilateral treaties on the transfer of offenders 
with different countries; and it has enacted domestic legislation, the International 
Transfer of Offenders Act, to give effect to those international treaties.2 For an 
offender to be transferred to serve his sentence in Canada, the consent of the 
offender, that of the sentencing state and that of Canada is required. None of the 
multilateral or the bilateral agreements provide for the offender’s right to be 
transferred to serve his sentence in Canada.3 The ITOA is also silent on that issue. 
However, Article 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that 
every citizen of Canada has a right to enter, remain in and leave Canada. At the 
same time, the International Transfer of Offenders Act gives the minister the 
discretion to refuse or allow a request by a Canadian imprisoned abroad to serve 
his sentence in Canada even if the sentencing state has consented to the transfer of 
the offender. The question is whether the relevant provisions of the International 
Transfer of Offenders Act are contrary to section 6(1) of the Charter in the sense 
that they violate the offender’s right to enter Canada. This is the issue that the 
Supreme Court dealt with in the September 2013 case of Divito v Canada (Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness)4 and will be the focus of this article. The fact 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in this case is of significant policy importance is 
recognised by the Court itself. By the time the case was heard by the Court the 
applicant had already returned to Canada after serving his sentence in the USA and 
the government argued that the case was moot.5 The Court agreed with the 
government that the case was indeed moot but held that it “retains a residual 
discretion to decide the merits of a moot appeal if the issues raised are of public 
importance ... [and that] this is such a case. The issues are likely to recur in the 
future and there is some uncertainty resulting from conflicting decisions in the 
                                           
1 Jamil D. Mujuzi, “The Transfer of Offenders from Other Countries to Canada: Analysing the Theory and 
Practice,” The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law (2013): 2 // doi:10.1093/cjcl/cxt019. 
2 Ibid.: 2. 
3 Ibid.: 12 – 16. 
4 Divito v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 47 (September 19, 2013). 
5 Ibid., para 50. 
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Federal Court.”6 In this article, the author intends to achieve the following 
objectives: highlight the different interpretative tools invoked by the Court to 
resolve the issues in question; and argue that the majority erred in their 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the ITOA. The author also discusses the 
implications that the decision is likely to have on the interpretation of some of the 
factors in the International Transfer of Offenders Act – those that have to do with 
human rights – that the minister is empowered to take into consideration in 
deciding whether or not to consent to the transfer of the offender to serve his 
sentence in Canada. Before I deal with that case, I will first outline the conditions 
that have to be met before an offender is transferred to serve his sentence in 
Canada. 
1. CONDITIONS THAT HAVE TO BE MET FOR AN OFFENDER TO BE 
TRANSFERRED TO SERVE HIS SENTENCE IN CANADA 
The conditions that have to be met before an offender is transferred to serve 
his sentence in Canada are found in the multilateral treaties that Canada has 
ratified,7 the bilateral treaties it has signed with other countries,8 and in the ITOA. 
These conditions are:9 the conduct for which the offender was sentenced is one 
which is punishable as a crime in the sentencing state and in Canada;10 the 
offender is a citizen of Canada;11 the person has not been convicted of a strictly 
military offence;12 at least six months of the sentence remain to be served at the 
                                           
6 Ibid., para 51; see also para 55. 
7 For the conditions of transfer in multilateral treaties, see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
Handbook on the International Transfer of Sentenced Persons (New York, 2012), p. 25 – 42. 
8 For the official citations of these treaties see Jamil D. Mujuzi, supra note 1: 2–3. 
9 It should be noted that some conditions are included in some agreements and not in others. 
10 Agreement with Argentina (Article III(a)); Agreement with Barbados (Article IV(A)) (the word 
elements of the offence are used); Agreement with Bolivia (Article III(1)); Agreement with Brazil (Article 
III(a)); Agreement with Cuba (Article III(a)); Agreement with the Dominican Republic (Article III(a)); 
Agreement with Egypt (Article 3(1)(e)); Agreement with Mexico (Article II(a)); Agreement with Mongolia 
(Article III(a)); Agreement with Morocco (Article 3(1)(E)); Agreement with Peru (Article III(1)); 
Agreement with Thailand (Article II(1)); and Agreement with the United States of America (Article II(a)). 
11 Agreement with Argentine (Article III(b));  Agreement with Barbados (Article IV(B)); Agreement with 
Bolivia (Article III(2)); Agreement with Brazil (Article III(b)); Agreement with Cuba (Article III(b)); 
Agreement with the Dominican Republic (Article III(b)); Agreement with Egypt (Article 3(1)(a));  
Agreement with France (Article II(c)) (the word national is used); Agreement with Mexico (Article II(b)) 
(the word national is used); Agreement with Mongolia (Article III(b)); Agreement with Morocco (Article 
3(1)(A)) (the word national is used); Agreement with Peru (Article III(2)); Agreement with Thailand 
(Article II(2)) (the word national is used); and Agreement with the United States of America (Article 
II(b)). In Catenacci v. Canada (Attorney General), 2006 CarswellNat 1364, 2006 FC 539, 144 C.R.R. 
(2d) 128, 291 F.T.R. 215 the Canadian Federal Court held that an a permanent resident does not qualify 
to be transferred to serve his sentence in Canada. Plachta has argued that “the domicile (residence) test 
[instead of the citizenship or nationality criterion] offers a better and more flexible solution” (see Michael 
Plachta, “Human Rights Aspects of the Prisoner Transfer in a Comparative Perspective,” 53 (1993) 
Louisiana Law Review: 1047). 
12 Agreement with Argentine (Article III(c)); Agreement with Barbados (Article IV(C)); Agreement with 
Bolivia (Article III(4)); Agreement with Cuba (Article III(c)); Agreement with the Dominican Republic 
(Article III(c)); Agreement with France (Article III(b)); Agreement with Mongolia (Article III(c)); 
Agreement with Peru (Article III(4)); Agreement with Thailand (Article II(3)) (the Agreement with 
Thailand provides for other grounds in the following terms: That the offender to be transferred was not 
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time of the application13—although in some circumstances the transfer can take 
place where the period left to be served is less than six months; or at the time of 
receipt of the request for transfer the sentenced person still has at least one year of 
the sentence to serve;14 the sentence is final, in other words, that no proceeding by 
way of appeal or by extraordinary review procedure of the conviction or sentence is 
pending in the sentencing state and that the prescribed time for appeal has 
expired;15 the offender has consented to the transfer;16 that the sentencing state 
and Canada have agreed or consented to the transfer;17 that the offender has not 
been sentence to death unless if he was sentenced to death the death penalty was 
commuted;18 that the provisions of the sentence, other than the period of detention 
or any period of probation, have been complied with;19 that the offender is not a 
domiciliary of the sentencing state;20 that the offender has served the minimum 
period required to be served by the law of the sentencing state.21 In deciding 
whether or not to consent to the transfer of a Canadian national or citizen to serve 
                                                                                                                           
being punished in Thailand for an offence: (a)against the internal or external security of the 
State;(b)against the Head of State of the Transferring State or a member of his family; or(c)against 
legislation protecting national art treasures.); Agreement with the United States of America (Article 
II(c)) (the treaty also provides that the offence should not be one against immigration laws). 
13 Agreement with Argentine (Article III(d)); Agreement with Barbados (Article IV(D)); Agreement with 
Bolivia (Article III(5)); Agreement with Brazil (Article III(c)); Agreement with Cuba (Article III(d)); 
Agreement with the Dominican Republic (Article III(d)); Agreement with Egypt (Article 3(1)(c)) (or the 
sentence is indeterminate); Agreement with Mexico (Article II(d)); Agreement with Mongolia (Article 
III(d)); Agreement with Peru (Article III(5)); and Agreement with the United States of America (Article 
II(d)). 
14 Agreement with Morocco (Article 3(1)(C)) (article 3(2) of the Agreement with Morocco provides that 
“In exceptional cases, the Parties may agree to a transfer even if the time to be served by the sentenced 
person is less than that specified in paragraph 1 C of this Article”); Agreement with Thailand (Article 
II(4)). 
15 Agreement with Argentine (Article III(e)); Agreement with Barbados (Article IV(F)); Agreement with 
Bolivia (Article III(6)); Agreement with Brazil (Article III(d)); Agreement with Cuba (Article III(e)); 
Agreement with the Dominican Republic (Article III(e)); Agreement with Egypt (Article 3(1)(b)) (it also 
provides that the offender may waive his right of appeal); Agreement with France (Article II(b)); 
Agreement with Mexico (Article II(e)); Agreement with Mongolia (Article III(e)); Agreement with 
Morocco (Article 3(1)(B)) (this agreement provides that the judgment has to be enforceable); 
Agreement with Peru (Article III(6)); Agreement with Thailand (Article II(5)) and Agreement with the 
United States of America (Article II(e)). 
16 Agreement with Argentine (Article III(f)); Agreement with Barbados (Articles VII(2) and VIII); 
Agreement with Bolivia (Article V(4) and (9)); Agreement with Brazil (Article V(6)); Agreement with 
Cuba (Article III(f)); Agreement with the Dominican Republic (Article III(f)); Agreement with Egypt 
(Article 3(1)(d)); Agreement with France (Article II(d)); Agreement with Mexico (Article IV(3)); 
Agreement with Mongolia (Article III(f)); Agreement with Morocco (Article 3(1)(D)); Agreement with 
Thailand (Article III(7)); and Agreement with the United States of America (Article III(10)). 
17 Agreement with Argentine (Article III(g)); Agreement with Cuba (Article III(g)); Agreement with the 
Dominican Republic (Article III(g)); Agreement with Egypt (Article 3(1)(f)); Agreement with Mexico 
(Article IV); Agreement with Mongolia (Article III(g)); Agreement with Morocco (Article 3(1)(F)); 
Agreement with Thailand (Article VII(I)). It should be noted that the agreement with France is silent on 
the consent of both the sentencing and the administering state before the transfer takes place. In 
practice however, the transfer is only likely to take place with the consent of both countries. 
18 Agreement with Barbados (Article IV(E)); Agreement with Bolivia (Article III(3)); Agreement with 
Cuba (Article III(h)); Agreement with Peru (Article III(3)). 
19 Agreement with Bolivia (Article III(7)); Agreement with Peru (Article III(7)). 
20 Agreement with Mexico (Article II(c)). The case of transfers to or from Thailand - Agreement with 
Thailand (Article II(7)), “the transfer may be refused if: (a) it is considered by the Transferring State to 
jeopardize its sovereignty, its security or its public order; or (b) the offender is also a national of the 
Transferring State.” 
21 Agreement with Thailand (Article II(6)). 
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his sentence in Canada, the minister is governed by section 10 of the ITOA which 
provides that he “may consider the following factors”: 
(a) whether, in the Minister’s opinion, the offender’s return to Canada will 
constitute a threat to the security of Canada; (b) whether, in the Minister’s 
opinion, the offender’s return to Canada will endanger public safety, including (i) 
the safety of any person in Canada who is a victim…of an offence committed by 
the offender, (ii) the safety of any member of the offender’s family, in the case 
of an offender who has been convicted of an offence against a family member, 
or (iii) the safety of any child, in the case of an offender who has been convicted 
of a sexual offence involving a child; (c) whether, in the Minister’s opinion, the 
offender is likely to continue to engage in criminal activity after the transfer; (d) 
whether, in the Minister’s opinion, the offender left or remained outside Canada 
with the intention of abandoning Canada as their place of permanent residence; 
(e) whether, in the Minister’s opinion, the foreign entity or its prison system 
presents a serious threat to the offender’s security or human rights; (f) whether 
the offender has social or family ties in Canada; (g) the offender’s health; (h) 
whether the offender has refused to participate in a rehabilitation or 
reintegration program; (i) whether the offender has accepted responsibility for 
the offence for which they have been convicted, including by acknowledging the 
harm done to victims and to the community; (j) the manner in which the 
offender will be supervised, after the transfer, while they are serving their 
sentence; (k) whether the offender has cooperated, or has undertaken to 
cooperate, with a law enforcement agency; or (l) any other factor that the 
Minister considers relevant. 
Before March 2013, the ITOA obliged the Minister to consider some of the 
factors above in deciding whether or not to consent to the transfer of an offender to 
Canada. The ITOA was amended and the word ‘shall’ in section 10(1) was replaced 
by the word ‘may’ to give the minister wider discretion in exercising his power to 
consent to the transfer of an offender to serve his sentence in Canada. The number 
of factors that the minister is to consider was also increased.22 Our attention now 
turns to the Supreme Court judgement. 
2. THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE ISSUES THAT THE COURT HAD TO 
RESOLVE 
In March 1995 Mr Davito was convicted by a Canadian court of conspiring to 
import and traffic cocaine and he was sentenced to eighteen years’ imprisonment.23 
While he was still serving his sentence in Canada, the United States requested his 
                                           
22 See Jamil D. Mujuzi, supra note 1: 20. 
23 Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), supra note 4, para 6. 
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extradition to stand trial for conspiracy to possess cocaine.24 He was extradited 
from Canada to the USA in June 2005. When he appeared in a court in the US he 
pleaded guilty to the charge of conspiracy to possess cocaine and was sentenced to 
seven and a half years in prison.25 In sentencing him ‘the American court took his 
Canadian sentence into account and gave him credit for 145 months of time 
served.’26 In December 2006, he requested to be transferred to serve his sentence 
in Canada on the basis of the International Transfer of Offenders Act.27 The USA 
approved his applications (he requested twice) for the transfer but on both 
occasions the Canadian Minister refused to consent to the transfer.28 It should be 
recalled that under the ITOA Canada’s consent is needed before any transfer can 
take place. The reason for decline to consent to Mr Divito’s transfer to serve his 
sentence in Canada given by the Minister was that Mr Divito “was identified as an 
organized crime member and the offence involved a significant quantity of drugs.”29 
This was in line with section 10(1)(a) of the ITOA. When the Minister refused to 
consent to his transfer, he sought judicial review of the minister’s decision on two 
grounds: one, that the decision was unreasonable; and two, that “the existence of 
a discretion in s[ections] 8(1), 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a) of the ITOA to refuse to 
consent to the return of a Canadian in a foreign prison violated his right to enter 
Canada protected by s. 6(1) of the Charter.”30 In dismissing Mr Divito’s review 
application, the Federal Court held that “in light of Mr. Divito’s history of criminal 
activity, the decision of the Minister to deny a transfer… was reasonable” and that 
“the impugned provisions of the ITOA did not violate s[ection] 6(1).”31 His appeal to 
the Federal Court of Appeal was also dismissed.32 It is against that background that 
he appealed to the Supreme Court. His argument before the Supreme Court was 
that “once a foreign jurisdiction consents to a transfer, he has an absolute right as 
a citizen to enter Canada. The Canadian government has no discretion to refuse the 
transfer of a Canadian citizen who is lawfully incarcerated by a foreign state.”33 
The issues before the Supreme Court were whether sections “10(1)(a) and 
10(2)(a) read in conjunction with [section] 8(1), of the [ITOA] infringe the right 
guaranteed by [section] 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;” and 
if those sections infringe section 6(1) of the Charter, is the infringement “a 
reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
                                           
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., para 7. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., para 8. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., para 9. 
30 Ibid., para 10. 
31 Ibid., para 11. 
32 Ibid., para 12. 
33 Ibid., para 14. 
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democratic society under [section] 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms?”34 What is evident is that the issues were raised in the context of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. But in resolving those issues, the 
majority and the minority decisions referred to both the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms and Canada’s international human rights obligations. It is now to 
those findings that we turn. 
3. THE HOLDING AND THE COURT’S USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
PREVIOUS JUDGEMENTS AND ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS TO RESOLVE THE 
ISSUES 
The majority35 referred to, inter alia, section 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms which provides that ‘Every citizen of Canada has the right to 
enter, remain in and leave Canada.’  They made is very clear that the ‘focus of the 
appeal’ was on section 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and that that section 
has three rights: the right to enter, the right to remain in, and the right to leave 
Canada.36 They were quick to define the ambit of the appeal by stating that “only 
the right to enter” was at issue in the appeal.37 Referring to the Court’s earlier 
jurisprudence, they held that section 6(1), like any other section, had to be defined 
generously.38 Against that background, they held that “the inquiry necessarily 
begins with an analysis of the purpose of the guarantee in s[ection] 6(1) and a 
consideration of what the right of citizens to enter Canada was intended to 
protect.”39 After referring to academic publications on the origin of the concept of 
human rights protection,40 they observed that “Canada’s international obligations 
and relevant principles of international law are also instructive in defining the 
right.”41 In support of that position, they referred to the Supreme Court’s previous 
decisions emphasising the role of international law in interpreting the Canadian 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.42 They also made reference to academic 
publications on this issue.43 It was observed that in interpreting section 6(1) the 
Court was to refer to Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights which had been ratified by 167 states including Canada.44 In the majority’s 
                                           
34 Ibid., para 13. 
35 Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ (the judgement was delivered by 
Abella J). 
36 Ibid., para 18. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., para 19. 
39 Ibid., para 20. 
40 Ibid., para 21. 
41 Ibid., para 22. 
42 Ibid., paras 22 – 23. 
43 Ibid., para 24. 
44 Ibid. 
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opinion, it was necessary to refer to the ICCPR because “[a]s a treaty to which 
Canada is a signatory, the ICCPR is binding.  As a result, the rights protected by the 
ICCPR provide a minimum level of protection in interpreting the mobility rights 
under the Charter.”45 It is on that basis that the majority reproduced46 Article 12 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides that: 
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, 
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.  
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.  
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except 
those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, 
public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of 
others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.  
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. 
The majority emphasised Article 12(4). The majority also referred to the 
Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 27 on the question of the 
meaning of ‘arbitrary’ under article 12(4) of the ICCPR. In that General Comment, 
the Human Rights Committee stated that: 
In no case may a person be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his or her 
own country. The reference to the concept of arbitrariness in this context is 
intended to emphasize that it applies to all State action, legislative, 
administrative and judicial; it guarantees that even interference provided for by 
law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the 
Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular 
circumstances. The Committee considers that there are few, if any, 
circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country could 
be reasonable. A State party must not, by stripping a person of nationality or by 
expelling an individual to a third country, arbitrarily prevent this person from 
returning to his or her own country.47 
The majority held that the above comment by the Human Rights Committee 
indicates that “[t]he right to enter protected by s[ection] 6(1) of the Charter should 
therefore be interpreted in a way that is consistent with the broad protection under 
international law.”48 The majority held that unlike other rights under section 6, the 
rights under section 6(1) are not subject to limitations.49 The majority referred to 
the drafting history of the ITOA and held that it is meant to implement Canada’s 
                                           
45 Ibid., para 25. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., para 26 [emphasis added by the court]. 
48 Ibid., para 27. 
49 Ibid., para 28. 
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international law obligations.50 The majority observed that the ‘essence’ of the 
appellant’s argument is that sections 8(1), 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a) “operate in a way 
that violates [his] right to enter Canada under s[ection] 6(1) of the Charter, a right 
he says is automatic once the foreign jurisdiction consents to the transfer.”51 The 
majority added that those sections: 
[P]rovide the Minister with a discretion whether to consent to the transfer of a 
Canadian offender.  [The appellant] argues that there should be no discretion — 
once an incarcerated citizen’s transfer is consented to by a foreign jurisdiction, 
the citizen’s right to enter under s[ection] 6(1) of the Charter requires that the 
Minister consent.  In essence, [the appellant] argues that s[ection] 6(1) includes 
an automatic right to serve a foreign prison sentence in Canada if the foreign 
state consents.  His submission would result in a positive obligation on Canada 
to administer the sentences imposed upon Canadian citizens by foreign 
jurisdictions.  This…misconstrues what s[ection] 6(1) protects.52 
The majority referred to publications on the issue of state sovereignty in 
international law and how it relates to the question of the transfer of offenders 
between countries and held that “as a matter of international law, Canada has no 
legal authority to require the return of a citizen who is lawfully incarcerated by a 
foreign state.”53 The majority also referred to the purpose of the transfer of 
offenders between Canada and the USA as stated in the treaty between the two 
countries and also the purpose of the transfer of offenders between countries54 and 
held that the consent of the sentencing state and that of the administering state is 
required in the transfer of offenders because “The ITOA was not intended to create 
a right for Canadian citizens to require Canada to administer their foreign 
sentence.”55 The majority added that: 
The ability of prisoners to serve their sentence in Canada is therefore a creation 
of legislation.  Independent of the ITOA, there is no right to serve a foreign 
prison sentence in Canada… [A]lthough the ITOA contemplates a mechanism by 
which a citizen may return to Canada in the limited context of continuing 
incarceration for the purpose of serving their foreign sentence, s[ection] 6(1) 
does not confer a right on Canadian citizens to serve their foreign sentences in 
Canada.56  
The majority concluded that: 
                                           
50 Ibid., paras 31 – 36. 
51 Ibid., para 38. 
52 Ibid., para 39. 
53 Ibid., para 40 [emphasis in the original]. 
54 Ibid., paras 41 – 43. 
55 Ibid., para 44 [emphasis in original]. 
56 Ibid., para 45. 
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The mobility rights in s[ection] 6(1) should be construed generously, not 
literally, and, absent a literal interpretation, I am unable to see how s[ection] 
6(1) is breached in the circumstances of this case.  Canadian citizens 
undoubtedly have a right to enter Canada, but Canadian citizens who are 
lawfully incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction cannot leave their prison, let alone 
leave to come to Canada. What makes the entry to Canada possible is the ITOA. 
But this possibility does not thereby create a constitutionally protected right to 
leave a foreign prison and enter Canada whenever a foreign jurisdiction consents 
to the transfer. Nor does it impose a duty on the Canadian government to 
permit all such citizens to serve their foreign sentences in Canada. The 
impugned provisions of the ITOA, which make a transfer possible, do not, as a 
result, represent a breach of s[ection] 6(1).57 
The majority added that although the issue of whether or not the minister had 
exercised his discretion reasonably in this case was not raised in the appeal, the 
minister’s discretion under sections 81 and 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a), “must be 
exercised reasonably, including in compliance with relevant Charter values.”58  
Like the majority decision, the minority59 were in agreement with the majority 
on the role of international law and the legislative history of the ITOA in interpreting 
the right in question.60 They did not agree with the majority’s position that the 
issue to be resolved was “whether the mobility rights guaranteed by s[ection] 6(1) 
of the Charter give Canadian citizens incarcerated abroad the right to require 
Canada to administer their foreign prison sentences whenever the foreign 
jurisdiction consents to the transfer.”61 They observed that “[a] correct 
interpretation of the right to enter Canada...demands an acknowledgment that 
effective exercise of the rights conferred by s[ection] 6(1) will often require the 
state’s active cooperation.”62 They held that: 
By its enactment of the ITOA and signature of the treaties the ITOA implements, 
Parliament and the Canadian government have recognized and encouraged the 
use of international prisoner transfers as a means of enabling Canadian citizens 
incarcerated abroad to enter and remain in Canada. The ITOA was precisely 
designed to safeguard and facilitate the exercise of these s. 6(1) rights.63 
They held that “[i]t is inconsistent to find that an international prisoner 
transfer has constitutional significance with respect to the right to remain in 
                                           
57 Ibid., para 48. 
58 Ibid., para 49. 
59 Chief Justice McLachlin and LeBel and Fish JJ. The judgement was delivered by LeBel and Fish JJ. 
60 Ibid., para 55. 
61 Ibid., para 59. 
62 Ibid., para 60. 
63 Ibid., para 63. 
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Canada, but does not engage the constitutional right to enter Canada.”64 The 
minority held further that: 
Parliament has crafted a regime whereby once the foreign state has consented 
to a transfer — thus removing the practical restrictions on an incarcerated 
citizen’s ability to return to Canada — the sole impediment to the exercise of the 
citizen’s s[ection 6(1) right is the Minister’s discretion. A statutory regime that 
grants a Minister the discretion to determine whether or not citizens can 
exercise their Charter-protected right to enter Canada constitutes, prima facie, a 
limit on the s[ection] 6(1) right of the citizens in question.65 
They concluded that sections “8(1), 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a) of the ITOA 
constitute a limitation on the rights protected by s[ection] 6(1) of the Charter.”66 
They held that the above sections were not unconstitutional because: 
Manifestly, the factors set out in [sections] 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a) relate to risks 
that arise upon the transfer of offenders, before their release.  Denying a 
prisoner transfer request based on security risks that may arise only after an 
offender’s release would be an unreasonable exercise of discretion grounded in 
an erroneous interpretation of the ITOA. A Minister’s exercise of discretion in 
such an unreasonable manner, however, does not render the factors themselves 
irrational. Properly understood, the factors and the Minister’s discretion are 
rationally connected to Parliament’s pressing and substantial objectives.67 
They added that: 
Given that in some cases the objectives of the ITOA would be served by refusing 
a transfer based on the factors set out in ss. 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a), the 
Minister’s discretion to consider these factors on a case-by-case basis is 
rationally connected to the pressing and substantial objectives of these 
provisions. In addition, at least in some cases, refusing a transfer based on the 
challenged factors will be the sole — and therefore the most minimally impairing 
— alternative open to the Minister. In light of both the binary nature of the 
Minister’s decision and the citizen’s continued incarceration, it is difficult to 
conceive of a less drastic means of achieving Parliament’s protective purpose. 
Finally, in our view, the impugned provisions are proportionate in their effect — 
that is their effects do “not so severely trench on individual or group rights that 
the legislative objective, albeit important, is nevertheless outweighed by the 
abridgement of rights”.68 
They held further that “t]he prejudicial effect of a transfer refusal on the 
mobility rights of Canadian citizens incarcerated abroad is further palliated by the 
                                           
64 Ibid., para 58. 
65 Ibid., para 64. 
66 Ibid., para 67. 
67 Ibid., para 76. 
68 Ibid., paras 78 – 80 [emphasis removed]. 
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fact that the citizens in question will be able to enter Canada after serving their 
sentences in the foreign jurisdiction.”69 They concluded that: 
The Minister’s discretion to grant or refuse prisoner transfer requests under the 
ITOA is broad and flexible. A large measure of deference is appropriate in the 
circumstances, given the complex social and political problems being tackled, 
such as security and terrorism... Each individual decision by the Minister must 
nonetheless respect the governing principles of administrative law and, of 
course, remains subject to judicial review. Moreover, the Minister’s discretion 
must be exercised with due regard for the s[section] 6(1) Charter rights at 
stake.70 
4. ANALYSING THE JUDGEMENT AND HIGHLIGHTING ITS HUMAN 
RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS 
The following section will analyse the judgement and highlight its implications. 
The author will also demonstrate that the judgement, read in light of Canada’s 
national and international human rights obligations, creates an opportunity for the 
issue of human rights to be brought to the fore in making the decision of whether 
or not the offender should be transferred to serve his sentence in Canada once the 
sentencing state has consented to the transfer. 
The first point relates to the interpretative approaches that the court invoked 
to deal with the issues that were raised. As indicated earlier, the court referred to 
the ICCPR and to the Human Rights’ Committee General Comment 27 in 
interpreting the meaning of the right to enter Canada as provided for under section 
6(1) of the Charter. In justifying why it had invoked the ICCPR, the court held that 
that treaty was binding on Canada because Canada has ratified it. This should be 
understood against the background that unlike the constitutions of some countries 
such as South Africa,71 and Malawi72 which expressly empower courts to refer to 
international law in interpreting the bill of rights, the Canadian Charter does not 
expressly allow courts to refer to international law in interpreting the Charter. The 
implication for the ruling is that the court has continued with its practice of referring 
to international law, especially the treaties which have been ratified by Canada, in 
interpreting the rights in the Charter.73 The Court also readily accepted the Human 
                                           
69 Ibid., para 83. 
70 Ibid., paras 85 – 86 [emphasis removed]. 
71 Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution (1996). 
72 Section 11(2)(c) of the Constitution (1994). 
73 For the role of international law in interpreting the Charter see: Daniela Bassan, “The Canadian 
Charter and Public International Law: Redefining The State’s Power to Deport Aliens,” Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 34:3 (1996); John Claydon, “Use of International Human Rights Law to Interpret Canada's 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” Connecticut Journal of International Law 2 (1986-1987); M. Ann 
Hayward, “International Law and the Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: 
Uses and Justifications,” University of Western Ontario Law Review 23 (1985). 
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Rights Committee’s interpretation of the ICCPR as a guide to understanding the 
rights under the Charter and in particular the right to enter Canada. In other words, 
the court indirectly suggests that in understanding Canada’s obligations under 
international law, the inquiry should go beyond the text of the treaty in question 
and should be extended to the jurisprudence and practice of the relevant 
international human rights body – in this case the Human Rights Committee.  
The second point flows directly from the first. In the author’s opinion it is 
surprising that the majority, after referring to article 12 of the ICCPR and General 
Comment 27, did not find that the relevant sections of the ITOA infringed on the 
right to enter one’s own country. Article 12(4) of the ICCPR clearly recognises that 
right and the General Comment in question states the circumstances in which such 
a right may be infringed upon. In the author’s opinion, the correct approach would 
have been, as the minority stated, to find that sections 8(1) and 10(1)(a) and 
10(2)(a) of the ITOA violated the right to enter under section 6(1) of the Charter 
and under Article 12(4) of the ICCPR and then proceed to investigate whether the 
violation in question was justified in the light of the other relevant provisions of the 
Charter, the drafting history of Article 12(4) of the ICCPR,74 the text of the treaty 
itself and the jurisprudence and practice of the Human Rights Committee. I will 
illustrate how that approach would have enriched the court’s reasoning. The 
discussion below will exclude the limitations on the rights under the Charter as 
those limitations were dealt with by the minority judgement in arriving at the 
conclusion it did. 
The drafting history of Article 12(4) of the ICCPR shows that “the general 
consensus was… that,…the right [to enter one’s country] was not absolute.”75 In 
fact, Canada submitted, although that amendment was later withdrawn, that Article 
12(4) should provide that “[u]nless lawfully exiled, anyone shall be free to enter 
the country of which he is a citizen.”76 The drafting history of Article 12(4) also 
shows that “[i]t was thought inconceivable, for example, that a State should 
prohibit one of its nationals from entering its territory for reasons of health or 
morality.”77 Although by the time the Article 12(4), and indeed the whole of the 
ICCPR was being debated, the issue of the transfer of offenders from one country to 
another was on the international agenda,78 the author is not aware of any country 
which proposed that one of the grounds that could or could not be invoked to limit 
                                           
74 I should hasten to add that even the minority judgement does not refer to the drafting history of 
Article 12(4) of the ICCPR. 
75 Marc J Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 262. 
76 Ibid., p. 260. 
77 Ibid., p. 262. 
78 Michael Plachta, Transfer of Prisoners under International Instruments and Domestic Legislation: A 
Comparative Study (Freiburg: Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, 1993), 
pp. 134–227. 
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a person’s right to enter one’s country was that he was serving a prison sentence 
abroad. What is critical is that a person should not be arbitrarily deprived of the 
right to enter his own country.79 It has been argued that “[i]n light of the historical 
background, there can be no doubt that the limitation on the right to entry 
expressed with the word ‘arbitrarily’ … is to relate exclusively to lawful exile as 
punishment for a crime, whether this is accompanied by loss of nationality or 
not.”80 The jurisprudence emanating from the Human Rights Committee has indeed 
dealt with the right to enter one’s own country. For example, the Human Rights 
Committee called upon Croatia to “ensure that no difficulties are put in the way of 
persons who left Croatia as a result of the armed conflict, in exercising their right, 
under article 12, paragraph 4, of the Covenant to return to their own country.”81 
The Human Rights Committee also recommended to Kuwait that “[t]he right to 
remain in one’s country and to return to it must be scrupulously respected.”82 
The Human Rights Committee has also handed down a number of 
communications on the issue of a person’s right to enter his country some of which 
have been brought against Canada.83 However, the author is not aware of any 
communications in which the Human Rights Committee has dealt with the issue of 
the person’s right to enter his country in the context of serving a prison sentence. 
It is worth noting that in Albert Womah Mukong v. Cameroon84 in finding that the 
applicant’s right under article 12(4) had not been violated by the state party, the 
Human Rights Committee observed that:  
[T]he Committee notes that the author was not forced into exile by the State 
party's authorities…but left the country voluntarily, and that no laws or 
regulations or State practice prevented him from returning to Cameroon. As the 
author himself concedes, he was able to return to his country in April 1992; 
even if it may be that his return was made possible, or facilitated, by diplomatic 
intervention, this does not change the Committee's conclusion that there has 
been no violation of article 12, paragraph 4, in the case.85 
                                           
79 Marc J Bossuyt, supra note 75, p. 262. 
80 Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl: N.P. Engel, 
1993), p. 219 [emphasis in the original]. 
81 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Croatia’s Initial Report, CCPR/CO/71/HRV 
(April 30, 2001), para 15. 
82 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, CCPR/CO/69/KWT (July 27, 2000), 
para 15. The Human Rights Committee made this recommendation in the context of people who had left 
Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation in 1990 – 1991. 
83 A.S., on her own behalf and on behalf of her daughter and grandson v. Canada, 068/1980 (the 
communication held inadmissible); Charles E. Stewart v. Canada, 538/1993 (dealt with deportation from 
Canada of a non-national); Giosue Canepa v. Canada, 558/1993 (deportation from Canada of a non-
national); Ruediger Schlosser v. Czech Republic, 670/1995 (communication held inadmissible); Simalae 
Toala et al. v. New Zealand, 675/1995 (deportation of a non-national); Ati Antoine Randolph v. Togo, 
910/2000; Francesco and Anna Madafferi and their children v. Australia, 1011/2001 (deportation of a 
non-national); and Jama Warsame v. Canada, 1959/2010 (deportation of a non-national). 
84 Albert Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, 458/1991. 
85 Ibid., para 9.10. 
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In Luis Asdrúbal Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia86 the Human Rights Committee 
held that: 
[C]onsidering the Committee's view that the right to security of person (art. 9, 
para. 1) was violated and that there were no effective domestic remedies 
allowing the author to return from involuntary exile in safety, the Committee 
concludes that the State party has not ensured to the author his right to remain 
in, return to and reside in his own country. Paragraphs 1 and 4 of article 12 of 
the Covenant were therefore violated.87 
The above communications and practice show, inter alia, that there are 
different ways through which a person’s right to enter his country could be violated. 
These include the existence of laws, regulations or state practices which make it 
impossible for him to return to his country or the fact that security situation is of 
such a nature that his return to the country would be risky. In light of the above 
drafting history of the ICCPR and the practice and jurisprudence from the Human 
Rights Committee, the author wishes to emphasize here that the minority were 
right in concluding that relevant sections of the ITOA indeed infringed on the 
offender’s right to enter Canada but that that infringement did not render the 
relevant provisions unconstitutional or contrary to Canada’s international human 
rights obligations as the right to enter one’s country is not absolute. 
Related to the above is the issue of whether an offender has a right to be 
transferred to serve his sentence in Canada once the sentencing state has 
consented to the transfer. The Court, both the minority and the majority, agreed 
that an offender does not have the right. Courts in Canada had, before the 
Supreme Court decision, in several decisions held that an offender does not have a 
right to be transferred and serve his sentence in Canada.88 This position is not 
unique to Canada. Courts in other countries such as the USA89 have also interpreted 
the relevant piece of legislation to conclude that an offender does not have the right 
to be transferred and serve his sentence in his country of nationality or citizenship. 
The European Court of Human Rights is also of the view that an offender does not 
have the right to be transferred and serve a sentence in his county of nationality or 
citizenship.90 The implication for the Supreme Court ruling lies in the fact the issue 
is now settled that a Canadian serving a prison sentence abroad cannot invoke 
section 6(1) of the Charter to argue that he has the right to be transferred and 
serve his sentence in Canada. Because of the fact that the Supreme Court’s 
decision dealt with human rights issues, the questions that arises is whether the 
                                           
86 Luis Asdrúbal Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia, 859/1999. 
87 Ibid., para 7.4. 
88 Jamil D. Mujuzi, supra note 1: 12 – 13. 
89 Ibid.: 16 – 17. 
90 Plepi v Albania and Greece, 51 EHRR 3, 53 (2010). 
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Supreme Court’s judgement leaves room for the argument that there could be 
cases where the Minister will be obliged, on human rights grounds, to consent to 
the offender’s transfer to Canada once the sentencing state has consented to the 
transfer. This is the issue to which our attention now shifts. 
It has been illustrated above that the minister has various factors to consider 
in determining whether or not to allow the offender to be transferred and serve his 
sentence in Canada. As mentioned above, the court held that in exercising his 
discretion the minister must act reasonably.91 The implication is that if he declines 
to consent to the offender’s transfer on unreasonable grounds, courts will be in a 
position to set aside the minister’s decision. Evidence shows that in the past 
Canadian courts have set aside the minister’s decisions not to consent to the 
transfer of offenders where they have found the decisions to have been based on 
unreasonable grounds.92 In one case the minister was ordered to consent to the 
offender’s transfer within a few weeks.93 It would appear that the Supreme Court 
decision raises new issues that could be invoked to compel the minister to consent 
to the transfer of an offender to Canada – in other words, the presence of these 
issues could be invoked to successfully argue that the minister’s decision not to 
consent to the offender’s transfer was unreasonable. 
In coming to the conclusion that a Canadian national who has been convicted 
of an offence in a foreign country does not have the right to be transferred to serve 
his sentence in Canada, the court held that such an offender is “lawfully 
incarcerated” in that country after having been “lawfully convicted in a foreign 
jurisdiction.”94 In the author’s view this holding raises the question of whether an 
offender who has been imprisoned in a foreign country after having been unlawfully 
convicted could invoke that as an argument to motivate for his transfer to Canada. 
This scenario could arise in a case where the person in question was convicted after 
a trial which did not meet international human rights standards – that is, where 
there was a flagrant denial of justice; or, for example, where the evidence which 
was relied on by the court for his conviction was obtained through torture.95 Related 
to the above is the issue of the offender’s continued imprisonment in Canada when 
the Canadian authorities are of the view that his conviction and subsequent 
detention in a foreign country were unlawful. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, Canadian courts have not dealt with that issue. However, the European 
                                           
91 Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), supra note 4, para 49. 
92 Jamil D. Mujuzi, supra note 1: 12–13. 
93 Ibid.: 13–15. 
94 Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), supra note 4, para 47. 
95 Article 15 of the Convention against Torture provides that “Each State Party shall ensure that any 
statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence 
in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was 
made.” 
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Court of Human Rights and courts in the UK have held that it would be contrary to 
the European Convention on Human Rights to continue with the imprisonment of a 
person whose sentence in a foreign state was as a result of a trial that amounted to 
a flagrant denial of justice.96 Canadian courts could also follow that approach. 
Another issue relates to that of human rights generally. It should be recalled 
that section 10(1)(e) of the ITOA provides that one of the factors that the minister 
may consider in deciding whether or not to consent to the transfer of an offender to 
Canada is ‘whether, in the Minister’s opinion, the foreign entity or its prison system 
presents a serious threat to the offender’s security or human rights.’ It is argued 
that if there is evidence that the offender’s internationally recognised absolute 
rights such as the right to freedom from torture are being violated, the minister has 
an obligation to consent to the offender’s transfer to Canada. This is because of the 
fact that by not consenting to the transfer of such an offender, the minister would 
be indirectly giving the state in question an opportunity to continue to subject a 
Canadian citizen to torture. But the minister could also be compelled to consent to 
the offender’s transfer if the offender’s right to healthcare is being violated. This is 
because section 10(1) (g) empowers the minister to consider ‘the offender’s health’ 
as one of the factors in deciding whether or not to consent to the offender’s transfer 
to Canada. Whether or not the right in question is an absolute right is not the 
yardstick by which to assess whether the minister exercised his discretion 
reasonably. The ultimate test is whether, to use the Court’s words, the minister 
“exercised [his discretion] reasonably, including in compliance with relevant Charter 
values.”97 
Another issue relates to the question of rehabilitation. Section 10(1) (h) 
provides that one of the reasons that the minister may consider in deciding whether 
to consent to transfer of the offender to serve his sentence in Canada is ‘whether 
the offender has refused to participate in a rehabilitation or reintegration program.’ 
The Supreme Court emphasised the fact that the purpose of the treaties on the 
transfer of offenders between Canada and other countries is to promote the 
rehabilitation and social reintegration of offenders.98 This fact has also been 
emphasised by Canadian courts in different judgements.99 Article 10(3) of the 
ICCPR also provides that “[t]he penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of 
prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social 
                                           
96 See Jamil D Mujuzi, “Analysing the Agreements (Treaties) on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 
(Offenders/Prisoners) between the United Kingdom and Asian, African and Latin American Countries,” 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 20 (2012): 388 - 390. 
97 Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), supra note 4, para 49. 
98 Ibid., para 42. 
99 Jamil D. Mujuzi, supra note 1: 5–9. 
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rehabilitation.”100 The court also held that the minister can invoke the ITOA to 
prevent the offender from entering Canada before he has completed serving his 
sentence not after he has finished serving his sentence.101 It is the author’s view 
that if an offender refuses to participate in rehabilitation programmes in a foreign 
prison on the basis that such programmes are irrelevant to him or if there are no 
rehabilitation programmes in the prison in question, the offender could argue that 
his transfer should be approved so that he is rehabilitated in Canada. Although the 
Court held that in some cases the objectives of the ITOA would also “be served by 
refusing a transfer based on the factors set out in [sections] 10(1)(a) and 
10(2)(a)”102 it is difficult to think of a situation where the object of the Act would be 
achieved by refusing to consent to the offender’s transfer on the basis that he has 
refused to take part in rehabilitation programmes he considers to be useless or 
where he is being imprisoned in prison where there are no rehabilitation 
programmes at all. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I have discussed the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgement 
which dealt with the issue of whether sections 8(1) and 10(1)(a) and section 
10(2)(a) of the ITOA were contrary to section 6(1) of the Charter. I have illustrated 
how the majority and the minority relied on international law, previous court 
decisions and academic publications to resolve the issues that they were dealing 
with. I have also agreed with the minority that the majority erred by adopting the 
approach they adopted. In my view, both the majority and the minority could have 
enriched their decisions if they had referred to the drafting history of Article 12(4) 
of the ICCPR and to more jurisprudence and practice from the Human Rights 
Committee. Although the decision dealt with two sections of the ITOA, the 
judgment is applicable to all the relevant factors in the ITOA that the minister may 
consider in deciding whether or not to consent to the offender’s application to be 
transferred and serve his sentence in Canada. The appropriate test to be applied in 
all cases in which the offender is challenging the minister’s decision not to consent 
to his transfer to Canada is whether the minister “exercised [his discretion] 
reasonably, including in compliance with relevant Charter values.”103 In other 
                                           
100 In its recommendation to the Government of Italy, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stated 
that “[t]he Government should also consider ways to ensure that reformation and social rehabilitation of 
the offender, which are essential aims of imprisonment according to … article 10 ICCPR … are not 
sacrificed to public security concerns” (see Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Mission 
to Italy, A/HRC/10/21/Add.5 (January 26, 2009), para 114. 
101 Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), supra note 4, para 76. 
102 Ibid., para 78. 
103 Ibid., para 49. 
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words, human rights issues are likely to feature prominently in proceedings of this 
nature. 
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